- https://eu.spb.ru/en/international/academics/imares/faculty/16019-troitskiy-mikhail
- International Relations, International Security, Russian Foreign Policy, NATO, United States In The World, U.S. Foreign and Trade Policies, and 10 moreRusso Chinese Relations, Security Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies, International Negotiation, Negotiation, International Relations Theory, US-Russian relations, Eurasia, and Peace and Conflict Studiesedit
- Mikhail Troitskiy is Dean of and Associate Professor at the MGIMO School of Government and International Affairs in M... moreMikhail Troitskiy is Dean of and Associate Professor at the MGIMO School of Government and International Affairs in Moscow and IMARES Program Professor at the European University at St. Petersburg. He holds the degree of Candidate of Sciences (kandidat nauk) in Political Science and International Relations awarded in 2003 by the Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.
Since March 2017, Troitskiy has been directing the School of Government and International Affairs at MGIMO University in Moscow where he manages Russia's first English-medium BA programs in International Relations. From December 2009 to March 2016, he worked as deputy director, program officer, and attorney at the Russia office of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. In 2007-2009, Troitskiy served as deputy dean at MGIMO's School of Political Affairs. He held visiting fellowships at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC (2005-06), as well as at Cambridge (2006) and Oxford (2008) Universities. In 2000-2009, he was deputy director and acting director at the Academic Educational Forum on International Relations, a Moscow-based NGO promoting scholarship and training in the field of international relations.
Troitskiy has taught International Relations History, Russian Foreign Policy, and Eurasian Security at MGIMO University since 2003. He has authored and edited several research monographs and published book chapters with Cambridge University Press, Palgrave, McGill-Queen's University Press, Johns Hopkins University Press, Praeger, Nomos Verlag, and SIPRI. His articles have appeared in Survival, The American Interest, Air and Space Power Journal, Russian Politics and Law, and others. Troitskiy's research interests include Russian foreign policy, conflicts in Eurasia, US-Russia relations, arms control and international security, and negotiation theory.
Troitskiy is a member of the Executive Committee for the Program on New Approaches in Research and Security in Eurasia (PONARS Eurasia), the Working Group on the Future of U.S.-Russia Relations, and the Steering Committee of the Processes of International Negotiation group of researchers. His has contributed op-eds and comments to major international media, including The International New York Times, The Moscow Times, CNN, NPR, BBC, and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.edit
The article introduces the special issue of International Trends dedicated to the current tendencies in the evolution of statecraft. It sets the analytical agenda for other special issue contributions by discussing the meaning of the term... more
The article introduces the special issue of International Trends dedicated to the current tendencies in the evolution of statecraft. It sets the analytical agenda for other special issue contributions by discussing the meaning of the term “statecraft” and illustrating the concept through several dilemmas that policymakers commonly face when choosing foreign policy toolkits. The authors posit that, at base, a meaningful defini- tion of statecraft subsumes the ends, means, and ways embraced by a government in its attempt to exert influence over another state short of the resort to brute military force, either directly or via pressures on key non-state stakeholders. The article goes on to highlight how a clear-cut formulation of a country’s “national interests” may, on one hand, serve as a lodestar for the national bureaucracy and draw “red lines” for the country’s adversaries, but on the other hand, entail a difficult and politically costly choice between mutually exclusive priorities for the country’s foreign policy goals. The authors also discuss the impact of technological innovation on the evolution of great power statecraft. They describe a variant of the security dilemma arising from the choice between immediate weaponization of new technology, on one hand, and refraining from such move with the aim of avoiding an arms race or escalation of existing con- flicts, on the other. In its turn, developing a strong identity as a means of statecraft for an international player may increase that player’s power of commitment, but at the same time, foreclose attractive policy options that cannot be implemented because they could compromise the chosen identity. Pioneering the use of big data in the study of statecraft, the authors find that, notwithstanding very different power posi- tions, traditions, and interests, U.S. and Russian discourse surrounding great power competition resemble each other more than commonly acknowledged.
Research Interests: Russian Studies, Peace and Conflict Studies, Security Studies, Russian Foreign Policy, Eurasia, and 10 moreUnited States In The World, Conflict Resolution, International Negotiations, United States Foreign Policy, National Security, Statecraft, Negotiations, Arms Control and Disarmament, USA Foreign Policy, and Economic Statecraft and Diplomacy
At the start of the 2020s, domestic political debates within democratic societies are heating up and at times radicalizing. The middle ground in such debates has been waning for more than a decade, while both left and right wings of the... more
At the start of the 2020s, domestic political debates within democratic societies are heating up and at times radicalizing. The middle ground in such debates has been waning for more than a decade, while both left and right wings of the political spectrum have become increasingly vindictive, manipulative, and uncompromising. Traditional conservatism is now flirting with populism, while liberalism is at the risk of being monopolized by emancipatory rhetoric and almost unbounded demands for entitlements by disadvantaged groups on both the left and right sides of the political spectrum.
Unlike the times of the Cold War when confrontation between the superpowers, in part fueled by ideological differences, divided societies across the Third World, today’s domestic polarization is not induced by global trends. In most cases, the sources of current polarization are purely domestic. They include economic grievance and the tension between equality for all from the perspective of political rights, on one hand, and the growing inequality among the same people from the perspective of accumulated wealth, incomes, and actual ability to have their voices heard, on the other. But can the reverse dynamic also occur whereby domestic divisions lead to intensified competition of ideas at the level of international community?
Unlike the times of the Cold War when confrontation between the superpowers, in part fueled by ideological differences, divided societies across the Third World, today’s domestic polarization is not induced by global trends. In most cases, the sources of current polarization are purely domestic. They include economic grievance and the tension between equality for all from the perspective of political rights, on one hand, and the growing inequality among the same people from the perspective of accumulated wealth, incomes, and actual ability to have their voices heard, on the other. But can the reverse dynamic also occur whereby domestic divisions lead to intensified competition of ideas at the level of international community?
Research Interests:
There are many perspectives on what factors lead to success in arms control negotiations. While some observers believe that only outdated or useless weapons are being put up for reductions, others emphasize the role of leaders’ worldviews... more
There are many perspectives on what factors lead to success in arms control negotiations. While some observers believe that only outdated or useless weapons are being put up for reductions, others emphasize the role of leaders’ worldviews and domestic politics in enabling arms control agreements. And yet, one important factor that is often overlooked is the role of narratives that may serve as a means of signaling a commitment to mutually beneficial, if risky, security solutions based on prospective arms control deals. This memo argues that when mainstream underlying foreign policy narratives in the United States and Russia have focused on security, arms control treaties have hatched relatively easily. But when those narratives—at least for one side—have pivoted around identity, or when there has been no clear shared uniting narrative, negotiations have dragged on or broken down.
Research Interests: Russian Studies, International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, Narrative, and 15 moreInternational Security, International Negotiation, Russian Foreign Policy, Negotiation, Conflict Resolution, International Negotiations, Narrative Analysis, Russia, United States Foreign Policy, Narrative Studies, Negotiations, Arms Control and Disarmament, USA Foreign Policy, Peace and Conflicts Studies, and Conflict and Conflict Resolution
The sudden onset of COVID-19 has challenged many social scientists to proceed without a robust theoretical and empirical foundation upon which to build. Addressing this challenge, particularly as it pertains to Eurasia, our multinational... more
The sudden onset of COVID-19 has challenged many social scientists to proceed without a robust theoretical and empirical foundation upon which to build. Addressing this challenge, particularly as it pertains to Eurasia, our multinational group of scholars draws on past and ongoing research to suggest a roadmap for a new pandemic politics research subfield. Key research questions include not only how states are responding to the new coronavirus, but also reciprocal interactions between the pandemic and society, political economy, regime type, center-periphery relations, and international security. The Foucauldian concept of “biopolitics” holds out particular promise as a theoretical framework.
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The onset of a crisis in US-Russian and global arms control has generated manifold proposals on ways to rejuvenate productive negotiations on weapons cuts and confidence building measures. Yet most of these plans are focused on technical... more
The onset of a crisis in US-Russian and global arms control has generated manifold proposals on ways to rejuvenate productive negotiations on weapons cuts and confidence building measures. Yet most of these plans are focused on technical details while failing to capture the central role of politics – both domestic and international – in enabling arms control. More important, many observers overlook the fact that, historically, US-Russian arms control negotiations only yielded concrete results when the sides were clear about their mutual intentions. Those intentions did not need to be cooperative; they could well be adversarial (as was the case during much of the Cold War). But for arms control to work, they had to remain at a stable, tested, and predictable level, which was clearly not the case in the late-2010s. To expect US-Russian arms control to regain its lost momentum by itself and salvage the political relationship would be to misunderstand the sources and context of past achievements in bilateral arms control.
Research Interests: Russian Studies, International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies, International Security, and 11 moreInternational Negotiation, Security Studies, Russian Foreign Policy, Negotiation, International Negotiations, U.S. Foreign Policy, United States Foreign Policy, Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control, Negotiations, Arms Control and Disarmament, and Arms Control
The book chapter scrutinizes one particularly prominent type of international negotiations: arms control. The author seeks to establish the imprint of focal points on arms control, and to determine how much they facilitated arms control... more
The book chapter scrutinizes one particularly prominent type of international negotiations: arms control. The author seeks to establish the imprint of focal points on arms control, and to determine how much they facilitated arms control negotiations. He argues that traces of focal points can be found in the numerical solutions that feature in such negotiations, but that the importance of numerical focal points should not be overstated. Moreover, it is shown that parties often disagree about which salient principle should be guiding in negotiations, but if agreement can be reached on a focal principle, agreement on the numbers of weapons to be maintained often follows relatively easily and that treaties that are supported by an agreed upon focal principle tend to be more stable.
Research Interests:
Actors in world politics often claim positions in the global pecking order on the basis of their ability to achieve desired outcomes in major areas of interest. Nations that are convinced in the effectiveness of their statecraft become... more
Actors in world politics often claim positions in the global pecking order on the basis of their ability to achieve desired outcomes in major areas of interest. Nations that are convinced in the effectiveness of their statecraft become worried if someone else demonstrates a better record of purposeful action. That feeling becomes stronger if the intentions of the actor with an edge in statecraft are perceived as malevolent.
The United States and Russia have a long history of concerns with surprise leaps in each other’s ability to exercise power. The current “scare” phase of presumed ongoing mutual subversion has particularly dire consequences for the bilateral relationship. For example, most negotiations between Washington and Moscow, including those on arms control, are doomed to fail given increased fears of exploitation by an opponent who is believed to be in possession of superior statecraft.
The United States and Russia have a long history of concerns with surprise leaps in each other’s ability to exercise power. The current “scare” phase of presumed ongoing mutual subversion has particularly dire consequences for the bilateral relationship. For example, most negotiations between Washington and Moscow, including those on arms control, are doomed to fail given increased fears of exploitation by an opponent who is believed to be in possession of superior statecraft.
Research Interests: Russian Studies, Peace and Conflict Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Security, Conflict, and 10 moreSecurity Studies, Russian Politics, American Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, Russian Foreign Policy, Conflict Resolution, Conflict Management, U.S. Foreign Policy, Statecraft, and US-Russian relations
The intensifying rivalry between the leading global powers (the United States and the European Union) on one hand, and the aspiring nations (such as China, Russia, India, Turkey, and others) on the other, creates additional challenges to... more
The intensifying rivalry between the leading global powers (the United States and the European Union) on one hand, and the aspiring nations (such as China, Russia, India, Turkey, and others) on the other, creates additional challenges to conflict resolution on the regional scale. The global and aspiring powers often seek to use these conflicts to sap their opponents’ resources, discredit their commitments and undermine resolve. As a result, most conflicts in post‐Soviet Eurasia and some in the Middle East (Syria) and Asia (disputes over China's maritime claims) become ‘frozen’ or intractable and defy resolution. Existing multilateral alliances and blocs across the conflict ridden regions are engaged in the struggle for members and appear incapable of concerted conflict resolution policies. What is needed to address the intensifying proxy conflict problem is a set of multilateral permanent negotiation fora bringing together the leading global powers and aspiring nations. Despite the manifold challenges to such scheme, the contours of a deal that can be reached within such fora is clear: status elevation for the aspiring nations in return for their good faith engagement with the leading global powers in conflict resolution.
Research Interests: Peace and Conflict Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Security, Security, International Negotiation, and 13 moreSecurity Studies, Foreign Policy, Eurasia, Negotiation, Regionalism, Conflict Resolution, International Negotiations, Central Asia, Regional Integration, Multilateralism, Negotiations, Regionalism and Multilateralism, and Great Power Politics
The book chapter analyses the positive role of ambiguity in the closing phase of negotiations. It looks at the Gorbachev/Kohl/Baker 1990 “NATO non-enlargement” negotiations, the Minsk agreements on eastern Ukraine, and the Iran nuclear... more
The book chapter analyses the positive role of ambiguity in the closing phase of negotiations. It looks at the Gorbachev/Kohl/Baker 1990 “NATO non-enlargement” negotiations, the Minsk agreements on eastern Ukraine, and the Iran nuclear deal as cases of “constructively ambiguous” compromises.
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Twenty-six years after the moment when Presidents Yeltsin of Russia and George H. W. Bush of the United States of America declared an end to their Cold War confrontation and a “new era of friendship and partner- ship” (Wines 1992) such a... more
Twenty-six years after the moment when Presidents Yeltsin of Russia and George H. W. Bush of the United States of America declared an end to their Cold War confrontation and a “new era of friendship and partner- ship” (Wines 1992) such a prospect still seems a far cry. The US–Russia relationship has been developing only in fits and starts, reaching previously unseen lows by mid-2018. Washington and Moscow conducted many rounds of bilateral and multilateral negotia- tions on the issues of mutual concern – from the ways to deal with the civil war in Bosnia in the early 1990s, to NATO enlargement and US missile defense deployments from the mid-1990s, to the fate of eastern Ukraine since 2014. Despite numerous phases of high ex- pectations, most of these negotiations did not result in sustainable agree- ments – so that the controversies re- mained in place and indeed continued to poison the relationship. The reasons for these failures has become the sub- ject of heated debate among policy an- alysts and academics, many of whom have used the empirical material from developments between the US and Russia as evidence to support theo- ries in the fields of Political Science and International Relations as well as to make generalizations about the two countries’ relations.
Research Interests: Russian Studies, International Relations, International Relations Theory, International Studies, International Negotiation, and 11 moreRussian Foreign Policy, Negotiation, United States In The World, Conflict Resolution, International Negotiations, Cold War International Relations, United States Foreign Policy, US Foreign Policy, US-Russian relations, Geopolitics of South Caucasus, United States, Negotiations, and US-Russian relations
Uncertainty in global economic or security affairs is often associated with risk. “And yet, ambiguity can be ‘constructive,’ bringing clear benefits in the field of negotiation and conflict resolution,” observes Mikhail Troitskiy, a... more
Uncertainty in global economic or security affairs is often associated with risk. “And yet, ambiguity can be ‘constructive,’ bringing clear benefits in the field of negotiation and conflict resolution,” observes Mikhail Troitskiy, a political analyst in Moscow. “Ambiguity can be a force for common good if practiced consensually, that is, if all sides in a negotiation agree to a moderately ambiguous deal in order to end the talks on a positive note and avoid escalation of their conflict.” All sides must assess their positions, whether they are prepared for a range of unpredictable events that could unfold, while determining just how much ambiguity can be tolerated by future leaders or constituents. Such agreements that de-escalate conflicts allow parties to conserve resources and status. In US-Russian relations, three examples of agreements featuring ambiguity include German reunification, the New START Treaty and the Minsk agreement on eastern Ukraine. Flexibility increases prospects for resolution.
Research Interests:
Challenges have been piling up in U.S.-Russian relations over the last five years. Confrontations—from arms control crises and Moscow shutting down NGOs to the Ukraine and Syria conflicts and sanctions regimes—will continue unless either... more
Challenges have been piling up in U.S.-Russian relations over the last five years. Confrontations—from arms control crises and Moscow shutting down NGOs to the Ukraine and Syria conflicts and sanctions regimes—will continue unless either government opts for a significant policy change. These policy disagreements largely result from core differences in perspective between Washington and Moscow on the fundamental issues of what constitutes the global and regional “order.” Given these deep-seated contradictions, the best chance to enable substantive U.S.-Russian negotiations on matters of regional and global concern could lie in aiming for agreements with ambiguous outcomes. Such agreements would set in motion a certain rules-based process that would be expected by each party to lead, with time, to a satisfactory solution without pre-determining that solution at the time the initial negotiation is concluded.
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Contradictions between the United States and Russia on the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe and the difference in their approaches to conflicts across post–Soviet Eurasia largely define the current adversarial relationship... more
Contradictions between the United States and Russia on the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe and the difference in their approaches to conflicts across post–Soviet Eurasia largely define the current adversarial relationship between Washington and Moscow. Over the last quarter-century, most of the attempts at building cooperative frameworks in other areas of that relationship, such as arms control, nonproliferation, the fight against violent extremism, or cyberspace governance, have foundered on the clashing approaches towards Euro-Atlantic security and post–Soviet Eurasia.
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A debate on Russia's tactic in mediating conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa
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This article attempts to offer conceptual insights into the modes and utility of negotiation in resolving conflicts in Eurasia, a region that has its own unique political, cultural and economic characteristics and an evolving security... more
This article attempts to offer conceptual insights into the modes and utility of negotiation in resolving conflicts in Eurasia, a region that has its own unique political, cultural and economic characteristics and an evolving security dynamic in interstate relations following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For the purposes of our study, we understand Eurasia to be the vast geographic space stretching from the western borders of the former Soviet Union to East Asia and encompassing the sub-regions of Eastern Europe, South Caucasus as well as Central, South, and North-East Asia.
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Интерес Соединенных Штатов к Армении в основном обусловлен влиянием армянского лобби на представителей законодательной власти США. Конгресс играет ключевую роль в формировании политики Вашингтона в отношении Армении. Под воздействием... more
Интерес Соединенных Штатов к Армении в основном обусловлен влиянием армянского лобби на представителей законодательной власти США. Конгресс играет ключевую роль в формировании политики Вашингтона в отношении Армении. Под воздействием армянского лобби, Конгресс обеспечивает значительный объём финансовой помощи Армении и вынуждает Белый дом регулярно возвращаться к обсуждению проблемы признания геноцида армян в Османской империи. Под влиянием Конгресса американская администрация также реализует программы поддержки Нагорного Карабаха, вызывающие трения в отношениях Вашингтона с Баку и Анкарой. В целом армянское лобби, опирающееся на ограниченные по размерам частные пожертвования членов армянской диаспоры США, демонстрирует сплочённость и целеустремлённость, что делает его сильным игроком в американском политическом процессе – как на федеральном уровне, так и на уровне штатов. Вместе с тем, турецкое и азербайджанское лобби, пользующиеся серьёзной поддержкой со стороны "титульных" государств, эффективно противодействуют армянскому лоббизму в Вашингтоне. Во второй половине 2010-х годов по объективным причинам повестка дня политики США в отношении Армении остаётся ограниченной и не сравнимой по масштабу с деятельностью американской администрации на "конкурирующих" турецком и азербайджанском направлениях внешней политики США.
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Over the past quarter century Russia’s strategy within multilateral organizations has been largely driven by considerations of power, status, and entanglement. In the 1990s, president Boris Yeltsin pursued membership in “Western”... more
Over the past quarter century Russia’s strategy within multilateral
organizations has been largely driven by considerations of power,
status, and entanglement. In the 1990s, president Boris Yeltsin
pursued membership in “Western” institutions, such as the
Council of Europe and G7, mainly for status-related reasons.
He sought to position Russia as an “autonomous member” of
the “European civilization”—a nation cherishing its political,
economic, and cultural ties with the West yet determined to
pursue an independent course in foreign policy dictated by its
national interests. For geopolitical reasons, these interests were
expected by the Russian leaders of the past quarter century to
differ substantially from those of major Western countries.
organizations has been largely driven by considerations of power,
status, and entanglement. In the 1990s, president Boris Yeltsin
pursued membership in “Western” institutions, such as the
Council of Europe and G7, mainly for status-related reasons.
He sought to position Russia as an “autonomous member” of
the “European civilization”—a nation cherishing its political,
economic, and cultural ties with the West yet determined to
pursue an independent course in foreign policy dictated by its
national interests. For geopolitical reasons, these interests were
expected by the Russian leaders of the past quarter century to
differ substantially from those of major Western countries.
Research Interests:
This article looks at the role of ambiguity in the closing phase of negotiation.
Research Interests:
Despite multiple official declarations of non-adversarial intentions issued by the United States and Russia over the past quarter-century, both sides have been unable to avoid repeated bouts of conflict escalation. This “unnecessary... more
Despite multiple official declarations of non-adversarial intentions issued by the United States and Russia over the past quarter-century, both sides have been unable to avoid repeated bouts of conflict escalation. This “unnecessary rivalry” can be explained in part as a “status dilemma”—a concept modeled on the better-known notion of “security dilemma.”
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Грузия относится к числу нескольких постсоветских государств, привлекающих наибольшее внимание американского внешнеполитического сообщества. Конгресс играет активную, хоть и косвенную роль в формировании грузинского вектора политики США.... more
Грузия относится к числу нескольких постсоветских государств, привлекающих наибольшее внимание американского внешнеполитического сообщества. Конгресс играет активную, хоть и косвенную роль в формировании грузинского вектора политики США. Заметный интерес членов Конгресса к Грузии обусловлен восприятием этой страны в качестве образца успешного реформирования по рыночным и либерально-демократическим стандартам, а также объекта нажима со стороны крупной соседней державы – России. Главными инструментами Конгресса в этой области являются политические декларации и требования в адрес администрации США, а также бюджетирование программ экономической и военной поддержки Грузии. На протяжении последних десяти лет Конгресс требовал от Белого дома ускорить процесс интеграции Грузии в НАТО и предоставить Грузии современные вооружения американского производства. Фактором, ограничивающим влияние Конгресса на политику США в отношении Грузии, является отсутствие могущественного этнического или коммерческого лобби, заинтересованного в поддержке Соединенными Штатами Грузии.
Research Interests: Congress (American Politics), U.S. Congress, Post-Soviet Politics, Russian Foreign Policy, Post-Soviet Studies, and 13 moreAmerican Foreign Policy in the post-Soviet space, Georgia, U.S. Foreign Policy, Georgian foreign policy, Congressional Politics, US Foreign Policy, US-Russian relations, Geopolitics of South Caucasus, Colour Revolutions, USA Foreign Policy, Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict, Elections in Authoritarian states, IR In Post soviet Space, De Facto States, and Caucasus and Central Asia
Russia’s approach towards relations with Ukraine since early 2014 heralds a major shift in Russian foreign policy. It has crossed a Rubicon that it will be difficult – though not impossible – to uncross. Indeed, Russian officials have... more
Russia’s approach towards relations with Ukraine since early 2014 heralds a major shift in Russian foreign policy. It has crossed a Rubicon that it will be difficult – though not impossible – to uncross. Indeed, Russian officials have themselves stated on more than one occasion that Russia’s relationship with Europe and the United States has undergone an irreversible change and will
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misreading the other’s intentions, or does the conflict in and around Ukraine result from a clash of interests, with each side determined to win and pre- pared to pay the necessary price? This is not an idle question. Our response has profound implications for the process of conflict resolution – both within Ukraine and between Russia and the West. A security dilemma type of con- flict can usually be resolved by confidence-building measures. In such cases, the contradictions are usually not difficult to overcome. In contrast to that, reconciling opposed interests requires a substantive bargain. In the absence of such a bargain, the balance of forces will need to change in order for the controversy to subside. Before that happens, recurrent spikes of tension are to be expected, at times resulting in open hostilities.
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misreading the other’s intentions, or does the conflict in and around Ukraine result from a clash of interests, with each side determined to win and pre- pared to pay the necessary price? This is not an idle question. Our response has profound implications for the process of conflict resolution – both within Ukraine and between Russia and the West. A security dilemma type of con- flict can usually be resolved by confidence-building measures. In such cases, the contradictions are usually not difficult to overcome. In contrast to that, reconciling opposed interests requires a substantive bargain. In the absence of such a bargain, the balance of forces will need to change in order for the controversy to subside. Before that happens, recurrent spikes of tension are to be expected, at times resulting in open hostilities.
Research Interests:
2015 The preferences of Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community differ greatly with regard to the processes and forms of further development of the European regional order. Nevertheless, a compromise is possible if the sides can agree on... more
2015 The preferences of Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community differ greatly with regard to the processes and forms of further development of the European regional order. Nevertheless, a compromise is possible if the sides can agree on the procedural frameworks and rules for the development of this order without predetermining the outcome of the evolution. Transferring the concept of moral and ethical values from the world of people to the community of states and international institutions is a difficult task from a methodological point of view. The regulatory foundations of the European international order (including the security interests of the participants in this order) consist not in specific values or principles, but in rules that guide the evolution of the order. The supremacy of these rules distinguishes the " European World " from other regional orders, for example, the East Asian or Latin American regional orders. The European order is essentially " procedural ". Norms and the European Security Architecture A normative assessment of the European order concerns not so much the shape of this order at a given point in time, but the process of its evolution or conservation. The normative principles reside in the specificities of the process rather than in any current or desired status quo. From the normative point of view, European security is the process whereby the European order constantly adapts to changing external and internal conditions. Thus, the main aim of the European security architecture are to avoid abrupt and uncontrolled change while remaining open to evolution under the influence of a changing internal and external environment. The above interpretation of normative foundations has two major consequences. First, the European order defies attempts to conserve any status quo for an indefinite period of time. A trend in the evolution of the European order may have negative implications for the declared interests of a specific player, but attempts to arrest that trend on the part of a minority of participants in the order are unlikely to succeed. Such attempts are akin to building a dam across a big river that results in bypass ways being discovered.
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Compared to past conflicts between Russia and the West, the Ukraine conflict has been noted for the use of “stealth,” or covert, action. Parties to the conflict have not only contested each other’s interpretations of facts but the facts... more
Compared to past conflicts between Russia and the West, the Ukraine conflict has been noted for the use of “stealth,” or covert, action. Parties to the conflict have not only contested each other’s interpretations of facts but the facts themselves. This is a new and potentially dangerous phenomenon, particularly between major powers. Undertaking large-scale covert action and denying responsibility for it may be rational as a way of gaining quick advantage in a conflict or as a response to a similar tactic already employed by one’s opponent. However, the risk that plausible deniability will generate powerful blowback effects is usually underestimated.
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The ability to commit makes for an effective mediator. Some conflicts can be resolved by mediators who cannot credibly commit to anything – be it full informational transparency, a focal solution, or punishment for defection. But... more
The ability to commit makes for an effective mediator. Some conflicts can be resolved by mediators who cannot credibly commit to anything – be it full informational transparency, a focal solution, or punishment for defection. But antagonism
between the parties in such conflicts is usually low. Successful mediation of highly antagonistic conflicts requires not so much brute force, but rather the ability to make credible
commitments.
between the parties in such conflicts is usually low. Successful mediation of highly antagonistic conflicts requires not so much brute force, but rather the ability to make credible
commitments.
Research Interests:
As a manifestation of higher-order wisdom than just the election needs of concrete leaders or political parties, national interests should discipline politicians and significantly restrict the freedom of their action. The selfrestricting... more
As a manifestation of higher-order wisdom than just the election needs of concrete leaders or political parties, national interests should discipline politicians and significantly restrict the freedom of their action. The selfrestricting function of the declaration of national interests is particularly important for Russia.
Research Interests:
Over the past two decades, China, Russia, and India have hammered out four types of reactions to problems posed by developed nations of the West in the fields of technology, international doctrine, and security strategy. Some of those... more
Over the past two decades, China, Russia, and India have hammered out four types of reactions to problems posed by developed nations of the West in the fields of technology, international doctrine, and security strategy. Some of those reactions - such as undertaking asymmetrical measures, imposing international legal or ethical constraints on Western initiatives, and mirroring Western innovation - were confrontational. Yet, oftentimes a conciliatory or even cooperative approach prevailed so that conflict among the "aspiring powers" and the West was avoided. Beijing, Moscow, and New Delhi usually sought to strike a balance between confrontation and cooperation with the challengers. However, the Ukraine crisis of 2014 heralded Russia's move towards a showdown with the United States and its allies. While Moscow has been trying to change the status quo forcefully by precipitating an anti-Western coalition, Beijing and New Delhi have refrained from endorsing a direct assault against the interests of the United States and its allies, deflecting Moscow's demands for a collective counterbalancing strategy.
Research Interests: Russian Studies, International Security, Security Studies, Russian Foreign Policy, Chinese foreign policy, and 11 moreChina studies, China's foreign policy, Indian foreign policy, BRICS, India's Foreign Policy, Emerging powers of Global South: Rising BRICS Countries, Emerging powers, Global power shift, Rise of BRICS Countries, BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), BRICS including South Africa, Impact of Brics on Global Governance, and relevance of BRICS in contemporary politics
In the contemporary world of growing complexity where major social, political, and economic shifts are determined by unexpected, cascade, and even catastrophic developments, facilitation of coordination among actors become vital. When... more
In the contemporary world of growing complexity where major social, political, and economic shifts are determined by unexpected, cascade, and even catastrophic developments, facilitation of coordination among actors become vital. When decisions on cooperation or conflict de-escalation have to be taken under severe time pressure, the importance of conspicuous solutions is difficult to overestimate. Such solutions are often called “focal points” and include numbers, objects, and phenomena the value of which as bases for coordination is expected to be evident to all parties involved.
Symbolism plays a crucial role in enabling compromise in arms control negotiation – an area prone to zero-sum thinking and excessive concerns about falling victim to artful exploitation by the opponent. The paper identifies three types of solutions embodied in arms control agreements: non-focal points, non-equilibrium focal points, and equilibrium focal points. Most negotiated arms control solutions come in the non-focal form. These solutions are reached without reliance on any symmetry or beauty of the number. Non-equilibrium focal points are the focal points in the vicinity of which there is another focal point, so that a shift from one to the other can occur relatively easily and oftentimes unexpectedly. One example of non-equilibrium focal points is provided by counter-value and counter-force targeting principles in nuclear strategy. Equilibrium focal negotiation outcomes are those in whose vicinity there are no evident focal alternatives based on different concepts of justice, such as “equal cuts” vs “total elimination.”
The paper proceeds to discuss the “promise of focal numbers” in arms control. It argues that round numbers began playing a visible role in arms control negotiations with the emergence of mass-produced standardized weapons. As the number of weapons at the disposal of each negotiating party was rising to overkill levels, these numbers became very large and abstract. With abstract models and simplistic scenarios ruling the day, solutions based on numerical focal points became easier for negotiators. This concerned, first and foremost, nuclear explosive devices and the means of their delivery. Over the 1960s, consensus emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as on a broader multilateral scale, that the accelerating expansion of the deadly arsenals had to be contained.
However, the power of focal points in arms control has failed to fully materialize. Numbers are usually dictated by the sides’ strategies and postures, that is, by their determination of the most likely adversaries and conflict scenarios. Arms control negotiations usually focus on the possibility of an agreed change in postures that would, in turn, lead to a review of the optimal numbers of weapons necessary to maintain the new posture. Once postures are defined, agreeing on numbers becomes relatively easy. The chapter considers a number of cases in both bilateral U.S.-Soviet/Russian and multilateral arms control negotiations as well as nuclear posture adaptations to illustrate the conceptual claims made in the chapter.
The paper also explores the impact of salient points – such as zero, the concepts of equality and proportionality – on arms control negotiations. It concludes that focal points have so far played a visible yet limited role in arms control. For the most part, arms control is negotiation about principles – broad concepts of threat, deterrence, force structure and posture etc. – rather than numbers. Once principles are defined, agreement on exact numbers of weapons can be reached relatively easily. Principles usually imply alternative focal points with arms control talks being essentially centered on making a choice among these points.
Symbolism plays a crucial role in enabling compromise in arms control negotiation – an area prone to zero-sum thinking and excessive concerns about falling victim to artful exploitation by the opponent. The paper identifies three types of solutions embodied in arms control agreements: non-focal points, non-equilibrium focal points, and equilibrium focal points. Most negotiated arms control solutions come in the non-focal form. These solutions are reached without reliance on any symmetry or beauty of the number. Non-equilibrium focal points are the focal points in the vicinity of which there is another focal point, so that a shift from one to the other can occur relatively easily and oftentimes unexpectedly. One example of non-equilibrium focal points is provided by counter-value and counter-force targeting principles in nuclear strategy. Equilibrium focal negotiation outcomes are those in whose vicinity there are no evident focal alternatives based on different concepts of justice, such as “equal cuts” vs “total elimination.”
The paper proceeds to discuss the “promise of focal numbers” in arms control. It argues that round numbers began playing a visible role in arms control negotiations with the emergence of mass-produced standardized weapons. As the number of weapons at the disposal of each negotiating party was rising to overkill levels, these numbers became very large and abstract. With abstract models and simplistic scenarios ruling the day, solutions based on numerical focal points became easier for negotiators. This concerned, first and foremost, nuclear explosive devices and the means of their delivery. Over the 1960s, consensus emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as on a broader multilateral scale, that the accelerating expansion of the deadly arsenals had to be contained.
However, the power of focal points in arms control has failed to fully materialize. Numbers are usually dictated by the sides’ strategies and postures, that is, by their determination of the most likely adversaries and conflict scenarios. Arms control negotiations usually focus on the possibility of an agreed change in postures that would, in turn, lead to a review of the optimal numbers of weapons necessary to maintain the new posture. Once postures are defined, agreeing on numbers becomes relatively easy. The chapter considers a number of cases in both bilateral U.S.-Soviet/Russian and multilateral arms control negotiations as well as nuclear posture adaptations to illustrate the conceptual claims made in the chapter.
The paper also explores the impact of salient points – such as zero, the concepts of equality and proportionality – on arms control negotiations. It concludes that focal points have so far played a visible yet limited role in arms control. For the most part, arms control is negotiation about principles – broad concepts of threat, deterrence, force structure and posture etc. – rather than numbers. Once principles are defined, agreement on exact numbers of weapons can be reached relatively easily. Principles usually imply alternative focal points with arms control talks being essentially centered on making a choice among these points.
Research Interests:
Общество должно четко сформулировать национальные интересы своего государства во внешней политике, чтобы избежать перенапряжения сил, обеспечить подотчетность властей и укрепить гражданскую идентичность. В государствах со слабым... more
Общество должно четко сформулировать национальные интересы своего государства во внешней политике, чтобы избежать перенапряжения сил, обеспечить подотчетность властей и укрепить гражданскую идентичность. В государствах со слабым гражданским обществом национальный интерес должен иметь вид общественного блага и не может сводиться к совокупности интересов частных групп влияния.
Research Interests:
A debate among U.S.and European experts on the need for NATO to deploy additional tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in order to counter "Russia's nuclear brinksmanship."
Research Interests:
Russia's policy vis-a-vis Ukraine in 2014 marked a watershed in Kremlin's international strategy and pushed Russia, Europe, and the world into a torrent of events that neither side (and especially Moscow) may not be able to control.
Research Interests:
Despite multiple official declarations acknowledging the end of confrontation between the U.S. and Russia over the past two decades, their relations remain haunted by the security dilemma. The mainstream Russian foreign policy discourse... more
Despite multiple official declarations acknowledging the end of confrontation between the U.S. and Russia over the past two decades, their relations remain haunted by the security dilemma. The mainstream Russian foreign policy discourse favors the realist paradigm of interstate bargaining over the liberal approaches that allow for change in a state's foreign policy preferences as a result of domestic political shifts. However, the realism does not offer a better explanation of the U.S.-Russia security dilemma than the liberal theories.
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Russian Studies, Russian Foreign Policy, China's foreign policy, US Foreign Policy, US-Russian relations, Geopolitics of South Caucasus, BRICS, and 9 moreEmerging powers of Global South: Rising BRICS Countries, Emerging powers, Global power shift, Rise of BRICS Countries, BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), India foreign policy, Foreign Policy of India, India Relations with Russia, India Russia Relations, Russia China Relations, and India and Russia
Research Interests:
Russia's policy vis-a-vis Ukraine in 2014 marked a watershed in Kremlin's international strategy and pushed Russia, Europe, and the world into a torrent of events that neither side (and especially Moscow) may not be able to control.
Research Interests:
Имеет ли смысл повторять мантру о «стабилизирующей роли» ядерного оружия, или более целесообразно поддерживать дискурс о бесполезности огромных смертоносных ядерных арсеналов перед лицом современных вызовов безопасности?
Research Interests:
By excluding one another from initiatives promoting engagement and integration with post-Soviet states, the West and Russia have created an inadvertent and unnecessary rivalry.
Research Interests: Eastern European Studies, European Studies, European integration, Russian Foreign Policy, Eastern Partnership Initiative, and 9 moreRegional Integration, Security Dilemma, Ukraine, EU-Russia relations, EU institutions, EU foreign policy, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, securitization, Integration, European Union, European Foreign Policy, European Neighbourhood Policy, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Union for the Mediterranean, Eastern Partnership, Foreign Policy Analysis, Principal-Agent, EU-Ukraine Relations, and European and euroatlantic integration of Ukraine
Research Interests:
Из всех государств постсоветского пространства, помимо России, Конгресс США уделяет наибольшее внимание Украине, что обусловлено активностью многочисленного и состоятельного сообщества этнических украинцев в США. В отсутствие лобби и... more
Из всех государств постсоветского пространства, помимо России, Конгресс США уделяет наибольшее внимание Украине, что обусловлено активностью многочисленного и состоятельного сообщества этнических украинцев в США. В отсутствие лобби и групп интересов, уравновешивающих влияние украинской диаспоры, правительство США по вопросам, касающимся Украины, обычно следует в русле предложений Конгресса. Основной линией Вашингтона в отношении Киева в 2011–2013 гг. являлось содействие сближению Украины с Европейским Союзом.
Research Interests:
Резкая и подчас презрительная риторика в адрес Украины усиливает антироссийские политические движения в этой стране. «Мягкая сила» Москвы еще больше пострадает, если после вильнюсского саммита начнется торговая война против одной или... more
Резкая и подчас презрительная риторика в адрес Украины усиливает антироссийские политические движения в этой стране. «Мягкая сила» Москвы еще больше пострадает, если после вильнюсского саммита начнется торговая война против одной или более стран «Восточного партнерства».
Research Interests: European integration, Post-Soviet Regimes, Russian Politics, Post-Soviet Politics, Russian Foreign Policy, and 13 moreEastern Partnership, Post-Soviet Studies, Enlargement and Integration in the EU, Politics of Russia, Regional Integration, Security Dilemma, European Union external relations, Russia, Foreign Policy of Ukraine, EU institutions, EU foreign policy, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, securitization, Integration, European Union, European Foreign Policy, European Neighbourhood Policy, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Union for the Mediterranean, Eastern Partnership, Foreign Policy Analysis, Principal-Agent, and Customs Union
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests: International Relations, Multiculturalism, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Law, Human Rights, and 18 moreGeopolitics, International organizations, NATO, Conflict, Security, Nationalism, Diplomacy, European Union, Ethnicity, Minority Rights, Peace, Future, Common Security and Defence Policy, EU-Russia relations, Freedom, NATO-Russian Relations, Atlantic Alliance, and New Strategic Concept
We somehow assume the interests of the negotiating parties given their declarations and observable characteristics. But these assumed interests could be imitated, or faked with some strategic goals in mind.
Research Interests:
Faking political identities or strategies has become a widespread course of action in Russian politics and society at large. As a result, fake debate and competition crowd out the real ones undermining both the domestic credibility of... more
Faking political identities or strategies has become a widespread course of action in Russian politics and society at large. As a result, fake debate and competition crowd out the real ones undermining both the domestic credibility of Russian politicians and of Russia itself as a player in the international arena.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
The tension between the United States and Russia over post-Soviet Eurasia1 has significantly undermined the prospects for mutual trust and cooperation on global security issues between Washington and Moscow, as well as stunting the... more
The tension between the United States and Russia over post-Soviet Eurasia1 has significantly undermined the prospects for mutual trust and cooperation on global security issues between Washington and Moscow, as well as stunting the region’s development. Much of the rancor is rooted not in an inevitable clash of interests, however, but rather in the way the two governments conduct their policies in the region. Both U.S and Russian modi operandi, or at least the aspects that cause trouble, flow in large part from certain habits that have proven extremely hard to break.
Research Interests:
U.S.-Russia relations have improved dramatically since hitting rock bottom three years ago. Yet several of the sources of tension that precipitated that downturn remain unaddressed. Among them, the nature of the United States’ and... more
U.S.-Russia relations have improved dramatically since hitting rock bottom three years ago. Yet several of the
sources of tension that precipitated that downturn remain unaddressed. Among them, the nature of the United
States’ and Russia’s relationships with the countries of post-Soviet Eurasia—the eleven former Soviet republics
besides Russia that are not NATO or EU member-states—is perhaps the most long-standing, and the one
seemingly least prone to resolution.
This study is the first to examine this issue in detail. It concludes that the assumption guiding much strategic
thought about post-Soviet Eurasia in Moscow and Washington—that the differences between the two
regarding the region are fundamental and therefore irreconcilable—is false. Indeed, the persistence of the zero-sum dynamic between the two countries regarding the region is highly contingent; it cannot be accounted
for by immutable factors inherent to either of them or the international system. Whatever its source, not only
has this dynamic been a key driver of past downturns in the bilateral relationship, but it has also done serious
damage to the development of the independent states of post-Soviet Eurasia themselves.
We identify three sources of U.S.-Russia tensions in post-Soviet Eurasia:
• Historically conditioned policy patterns. The legacy of the past can explain many U.S.-Russia
disagreements regarding post-Soviet Eurasia. The continuation of Soviet-era patterns of thought and
behavior has led Russia to treat post-Soviet Eurasian countries with a heavy hand. In the United States, the
objective from the early 1990s of bolstering the sovereignty of post-Soviet Eurasian countries later mutated
into a posture of countering all forms of Russian influence in the region. Another path-dependent factor
behind the tensions between the United States and Russia is their support for competing economic and
security integration initiatives in the region. The absence of pan-Eurasian integration initiatives and fact
that the West’s institutional enlargement since 1991 has been de facto closed off to Russia have created an
“integration dilemma,” which Moscow resolved by pioneering its own integration initiatives.
• Parochial agendas. U.S.-Russia rivalry in post-Soviet Eurasia has been further reinforced by the
parochial agendas of actors such as business lobbies and “freelancing” government agencies. Rarely
consistent with the national interests of either country, these agendas have often been a source of friction
between Moscow and Washington.
• Mutual misperceptions. Patterns in the analyses and normative judgments concerning U.S. and Russian
actions in post-Soviet Eurasia reflect a basic assumption: that the influence of one country in the region
necessarily comes at the expense of the other’s interests. But frequently these claims lack conclusive
empirical evidence. In the United States, Russian influence in the region is often perceived to threaten
the sovereignty and independence of the states of post-Soviet Eurasia, and to undermine prospects for
democratic reform in these countries. In Russia, meanwhile, some see the specter of containment in any
U.S. engagement in the neighborhood.
As a result of these factors, Russia and the United States have become prone to viewing their interaction
in post-Soviet Eurasia as a zero-sum game. Over the past twenty years, there have been instances in almost
all the post-Soviet Eurasian states where the United States and Russia have sought to balance each other’s
influence rather than find outcomes acceptable to themselves and the state in question. Indeed, actions based
on perceived U.S.-Russia competition have at times set back the political and economic development of the
countries of post-Soviet Eurasia and contributed to the ossification of unresolved conflicts.
Washington and Moscow now face a choice: they can pursue a maximalist vision of “victory” over each
another in the region (and expect a return to the near-confrontation of 2008), or they can seek “win-win-win”
outcomes for the United States, Russia and the countries of post-Soviet Eurasia. The oft-invoked “grand
bargains” to demarcate “spheres of influence”—enthusiastically endorsed by some, vehemently denounced by
others—are figures of speech, not feasible policy options. We propose six measures to facilitate positive-sum
outcomes:
• Implement greater transparency. The United States and Russia should regularly convey information
about their respective policies and activities in the region on a direct, government-to-government basis to
avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations.
• Regularize bilateral consultations on regional issues. Officials from Washington and Moscow whose
portfolios include post-Soviet Eurasian countries should regularly conduct working-level consultations
on regional issues. Diplomats on the ground should establish channels of communication, both with one
other and, when needed, trilaterally with officials of the countries where they are stationed.
• Adjust public rhetoric. Official statements about the region from the United States and Russia often
contain inflammatory rhetoric that provoke counterproductive responses. The governments should modify
the language they use in their public statements.
• Take domestic contexts into account. U.S. and Russian officials should remember that their
counterparts do not operate in vacuums. Proposals that would be anathema in the respective domestic
political environments are unlikely to be met with approval.
• Signal positive-sum intentions. Officials should make a point of publicly affirming a positive-sum
approach to bilateral interactions in the region.
• Be aware of parochial influences. Senior policymakers must be conscious of the impact of parochial
agendas on policy, and take action to mitigate it when circumstances merit.
The study analyzes in detail two examples of U.S.-Russia disagreement in the region—the Georgia conflicts
and competing integration initiatives—and offers practical recommendations for addressing them.
While implementing all of these policy recommendations would not eliminate competition between the
United States and Russia in post-Soviet Eurasia—especially among firms from the two countries—it would
remove a major source of tension that has in the past nearly upended the U.S.-Russia relationship. Such a
breakthrough would bring important benefits to both the United States, Russia and the countries of the region.
sources of tension that precipitated that downturn remain unaddressed. Among them, the nature of the United
States’ and Russia’s relationships with the countries of post-Soviet Eurasia—the eleven former Soviet republics
besides Russia that are not NATO or EU member-states—is perhaps the most long-standing, and the one
seemingly least prone to resolution.
This study is the first to examine this issue in detail. It concludes that the assumption guiding much strategic
thought about post-Soviet Eurasia in Moscow and Washington—that the differences between the two
regarding the region are fundamental and therefore irreconcilable—is false. Indeed, the persistence of the zero-sum dynamic between the two countries regarding the region is highly contingent; it cannot be accounted
for by immutable factors inherent to either of them or the international system. Whatever its source, not only
has this dynamic been a key driver of past downturns in the bilateral relationship, but it has also done serious
damage to the development of the independent states of post-Soviet Eurasia themselves.
We identify three sources of U.S.-Russia tensions in post-Soviet Eurasia:
• Historically conditioned policy patterns. The legacy of the past can explain many U.S.-Russia
disagreements regarding post-Soviet Eurasia. The continuation of Soviet-era patterns of thought and
behavior has led Russia to treat post-Soviet Eurasian countries with a heavy hand. In the United States, the
objective from the early 1990s of bolstering the sovereignty of post-Soviet Eurasian countries later mutated
into a posture of countering all forms of Russian influence in the region. Another path-dependent factor
behind the tensions between the United States and Russia is their support for competing economic and
security integration initiatives in the region. The absence of pan-Eurasian integration initiatives and fact
that the West’s institutional enlargement since 1991 has been de facto closed off to Russia have created an
“integration dilemma,” which Moscow resolved by pioneering its own integration initiatives.
• Parochial agendas. U.S.-Russia rivalry in post-Soviet Eurasia has been further reinforced by the
parochial agendas of actors such as business lobbies and “freelancing” government agencies. Rarely
consistent with the national interests of either country, these agendas have often been a source of friction
between Moscow and Washington.
• Mutual misperceptions. Patterns in the analyses and normative judgments concerning U.S. and Russian
actions in post-Soviet Eurasia reflect a basic assumption: that the influence of one country in the region
necessarily comes at the expense of the other’s interests. But frequently these claims lack conclusive
empirical evidence. In the United States, Russian influence in the region is often perceived to threaten
the sovereignty and independence of the states of post-Soviet Eurasia, and to undermine prospects for
democratic reform in these countries. In Russia, meanwhile, some see the specter of containment in any
U.S. engagement in the neighborhood.
As a result of these factors, Russia and the United States have become prone to viewing their interaction
in post-Soviet Eurasia as a zero-sum game. Over the past twenty years, there have been instances in almost
all the post-Soviet Eurasian states where the United States and Russia have sought to balance each other’s
influence rather than find outcomes acceptable to themselves and the state in question. Indeed, actions based
on perceived U.S.-Russia competition have at times set back the political and economic development of the
countries of post-Soviet Eurasia and contributed to the ossification of unresolved conflicts.
Washington and Moscow now face a choice: they can pursue a maximalist vision of “victory” over each
another in the region (and expect a return to the near-confrontation of 2008), or they can seek “win-win-win”
outcomes for the United States, Russia and the countries of post-Soviet Eurasia. The oft-invoked “grand
bargains” to demarcate “spheres of influence”—enthusiastically endorsed by some, vehemently denounced by
others—are figures of speech, not feasible policy options. We propose six measures to facilitate positive-sum
outcomes:
• Implement greater transparency. The United States and Russia should regularly convey information
about their respective policies and activities in the region on a direct, government-to-government basis to
avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations.
• Regularize bilateral consultations on regional issues. Officials from Washington and Moscow whose
portfolios include post-Soviet Eurasian countries should regularly conduct working-level consultations
on regional issues. Diplomats on the ground should establish channels of communication, both with one
other and, when needed, trilaterally with officials of the countries where they are stationed.
• Adjust public rhetoric. Official statements about the region from the United States and Russia often
contain inflammatory rhetoric that provoke counterproductive responses. The governments should modify
the language they use in their public statements.
• Take domestic contexts into account. U.S. and Russian officials should remember that their
counterparts do not operate in vacuums. Proposals that would be anathema in the respective domestic
political environments are unlikely to be met with approval.
• Signal positive-sum intentions. Officials should make a point of publicly affirming a positive-sum
approach to bilateral interactions in the region.
• Be aware of parochial influences. Senior policymakers must be conscious of the impact of parochial
agendas on policy, and take action to mitigate it when circumstances merit.
The study analyzes in detail two examples of U.S.-Russia disagreement in the region—the Georgia conflicts
and competing integration initiatives—and offers practical recommendations for addressing them.
While implementing all of these policy recommendations would not eliminate competition between the
United States and Russia in post-Soviet Eurasia—especially among firms from the two countries—it would
remove a major source of tension that has in the past nearly upended the U.S.-Russia relationship. Such a
breakthrough would bring important benefits to both the United States, Russia and the countries of the region.
Research Interests:
The talk discusses the concept of statecraft and dilemmas of statecraft for major contemporary international players with a focus on Russia. Delivered in January 2020 at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of... more
The talk discusses the concept of statecraft and dilemmas of statecraft for major contemporary international players with a focus on Russia. Delivered in January 2020 at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology
Research Interests:
Authors, a co-editor, and an invited speaker discuss the newly published volume (McGill-Queen's UP / CIGI, December 2017) titled "Tug of War: Negotiating Security in Eurasia" at the George Washington University on January 5, 2018.
Research Interests: Russian Studies, International Relations, International Relations Theory, Peace and Conflict Studies, International Studies, and 11 moreInternational Security, Security, International Negotiation, Security Studies, Russian Foreign Policy, Negotiation, Conflict Resolution, International Negotiations, Conflict Management, Ethnic Conflict and Civil War, and Negotiations
Talk at the panel on "Beyond Confrontation: The New U.S. and Russian Nuclear Doctrines and Prospects for Averting Destabilization"
Research Interests: Russian Studies, Strategy (Military Science), International Relations, International Relations Theory, International Studies, and 12 moreInternational Security, Strategic Studies, Security, Nuclear Weapons, Security Studies, Russian Foreign Policy, Negotiation, United States In The World, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, Strategy, United States Foreign Policy, and Negotiations
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Политолог Михаил Троицкий о перспективах масштабного военного конфликта
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Программа "Арехология" на "Столица FM". Выпуск от 11 сентября 2014 года. Ведущий Сергей Медведев
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Research Interests:
Conflicts in Eurasia have been receiving significant attention in the last few years from political scientists and international relations scholars. The geographic area of Eurasia lies at the intersection of global and regional conflicts... more
Conflicts in Eurasia have been receiving significant attention in the last few years from political scientists and international relations scholars. The geographic area of Eurasia lies at the intersection of global and regional conflicts and coordination games. On the one hand, regional controversies in Eurasia often affect relations among the great powers on a global scale - for instance, Russia believes it is engaged in a clash with the United States and its allies in post-Soviet Eurasia and that by obstructing EU and US policies in its neighbourhood, Moscow not only protects its security interests but also precipitates the demise of the US-centric world order. On the other hand, global rivalries can either exacerbate tensions or facilitate negotiated solutions across Eurasia, mostly as a result of competitive behaviour among major powers in conflict mediation.
Few scholars have focused on the negotiation process or brought together the whole variety of seemingly disparate yet comparable cases. This volume, edited by two global security experts - one from Canada and one from Russia - examines negotiations that continue after the “hot phase” of a conflict has ended and the focus becomes the search for lasting security solutions. Tug of War brings together conflict and security experts from Russia, Eurasia, and the West to tackle the overarching question: how useful has the process of negotiation been in resolving or mitigating different conflicts and coordination problems in Eurasia, compared to attempts at exploiting or achieving a decisive advantage over one’s opponents?
Few scholars have focused on the negotiation process or brought together the whole variety of seemingly disparate yet comparable cases. This volume, edited by two global security experts - one from Canada and one from Russia - examines negotiations that continue after the “hot phase” of a conflict has ended and the focus becomes the search for lasting security solutions. Tug of War brings together conflict and security experts from Russia, Eurasia, and the West to tackle the overarching question: how useful has the process of negotiation been in resolving or mitigating different conflicts and coordination problems in Eurasia, compared to attempts at exploiting or achieving a decisive advantage over one’s opponents?